Iran, Nuclear Weapons, and the NPT Crisis

22 Jun 2025 GS 2 International Relations
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Four Phases of Iran’s Nuclear Journey

  1. Phase 1 – Model State (1968–1979):

    • Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on July 1, 1968, and ratified it in 1970 under Shah Reza Pahlavi.

    • Promoted peaceful nuclear energy under the White Revolution.

    • Cooperated with global non-proliferation norms.

  2. Phase 2 – Ambiguity (1979–2002):

    • Post-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran became a theocratic republic.

    • Ambiguous stance on nuclear weapons; Ayatollah Khomeini initially rejected nuclear arms.

    • Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) and Saddam Hussein’s chemical attacks prompted Iran to reconsider deterrence options.

  3. Phase 3 – Exposure and Isolation (2002–2015):

    • In 2002, Iranian dissidents exposed secret nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, violating NPT safeguards.

    • In 2005, IAEA found Iran non-compliant; Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol in 2006.

    • Resulted in UN sanctions (2006–2014).

    • President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad emphasized uranium enrichment as a sovereign right.

    • JCPOA signed in 2015 under President Hassan Rouhani with P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia + Germany) — Iran agreed to curb enrichment in return for sanction relief.

  4. Phase 4 – Breakdown of Diplomacy (2018–present):

    • 2018: U.S. President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA and reimposed sanctions.

    • Iran resumed enrichment, exceeding JCPOA limits by 2022, nearing weapons-grade uranium.

    • 2025: Israeli airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities further escalated tensions.

    • Iran threatens to invoke Article X of the NPT to withdraw, citing “extraordinary events” (Israeli strikes) that threaten national interest.

    • President Masoud Pezeshkian maintains Iran does not seek nuclear arms, but diplomacy is now stalled.


Consequences and Global Implications

  • A nuclear-armed Iran may spark a regional arms race in West Asia (e.g., Saudi Arabia seeking weapons).

  • International community divided between pressure (sanctions, military) and engagement (diplomacy).

  • If diplomacy fails, the world faces:

    • A nuclear Iran, or

    • A war to prevent a nuclear Iran — both defeat the original intent of the NPT.


Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

  • Opened: 1968; Came into force: 1970.

  • Three Pillars:

    1. Non-proliferation prevent spread of nuclear weapons.

    2. Disarmament – gradual disarmament of existing nuclear powers.

    3. Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy – all nations can pursue civil nuclear tech under safeguards.

  • Article X: Allows a country to withdraw with a 3-month notice if “extraordinary events” threaten national interests.


India and the NPT

  • India is not a signatory to the NPT.

  • Reasons for refusal:

    • NPT is discriminatory, as it permanently legitimizes the nuclear weapons of five countries (US, UK, France, Russia, China) while barring others.

    • India views NPT as legitimizing nuclear apartheid.

    • India supports universal and non-discriminatory disarmament, but not under current NPT terms.

  • India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (Smiling Buddha) and became a de facto nuclear power.

  • Despite being outside the NPT:

    • India has maintained a strong non-proliferation record.

    • Entered into civil nuclear agreements (e.g., India–U.S. Civil Nuclear Deal, 2008).

    • Gained a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2008, enabling nuclear trade despite NPT non-membership.



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